CIAO DATE: 12/2013
Volume: 4, Issue: 2
December 2013
The Arab Spring: Safeguarding U.S. Interests for the Long-Term
James A. Larocco, William L. Goodyear
the “arab Springs” that are underway throughout the region share some common features, including the yearning and visible desires for a variety of “Freedoms From”: freedom from the oppression of dictators and their stooges, freedom from economic exploitation, and freedom from censorship, to name a few. at the same time, these countries have not even begun the national dialogue on what they want “Freedom For.” Do the peoples of this region want democratic competition or the replacement of one oligarchy for another, market or statist economies, full freedom of expression, or limited national and individual discourse? In our view, as the united States looks at the region, we need to acknowledge several realities:
"Train as You Fight" Revisited: Preparing for a Comprehensive Approach
Sebastiaan Rietjens, Paul C. Van Fenema, Peter Essens
I n 1973 General William F. DePuy, first commander of the u.S. army’s training and Doctrine Command (tRaDOC), emphasized that it was necessary to expose soldiers to realistic battlefield conditions before they experienced actual combat.1 Doing this should improve the soldiers’ preparation and thereby, in the long run, their effectiveness and efficiency. DePuy’s belief was widely shared and led to the development of new training methods and a training philosophy that is often referred to as “train as you fight”. ever since, military training programs have continuously been improved and better shaped towards the real threats that soldiers were facing in the theater. a clear example reflecting the new philosophy was the establishment of the uS Combat training Centers (CtCs). the five pillars upon which the CtC program is based, require (1) that participating units be organized as they would for actual combat, (2) a dedicated, doctrinally proficient operations group, (3) a dedicated, realistic opposing force (OPFOR), (4) a training facility being capable of simulating combat conditions, and (5) a base infrastructure.2 this suggests that the main focus in training is to develop a combat ready force that is physically and psychologically prepared to fight and win wars.3 the dominant focus on combat readiness is also mentioned in a 2006 RaND report reviewing for the united States army its leadership development. the authors concluded that whereas changes in operational environment were identified (e.g. “operations other than war”), “adaptation has centered largely on the more tangible elements and mechanics of war.”
Liora Danan, Johanna Mendelson Forman
F oreign internal conflicts clearly remain a permanent feature of the u.S. foreign policy landscape, especially since the united States regularly participates in efforts to stabilize countries affected by conflict and then helps them recover afterwards. Yet u.S. government officials and the american public in general have difficulty accepting the inevitability of u.S. involvement in such efforts. to ensure lasting progress and security in post-conflict situations, the united States must adjust its approach from a focus on large military operations to preparing adequately for small-scale, long-term interventions. Most u.S. military deployments since the end of the Cold War have been in “small wars” or what the Department of Defense once called “military operations other than war.”1 Yet the military has usually been more prepared to fight large, technologically advanced wars than smaller contingencies that require greater integration with civilian capacities. as a consequence, each time the u.S. military is deployed to a complex–but “small”–emergency, it has had to relearn lessons on the ground about the best way to manage these types of contingencies. Civilian participation in stabilization and reconstruction efforts is likewise inevitable, but civilian institutions are even less prepared for such work than the military. Lessons learned over the last decade are only recently being institutionalized, through offices like Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and the u.S. agency for International Development’s Office of transition Initiatives (OtI). In part this is due to bureaucratic politics.
Regime Change Without Military Force: Lessons from Overthrowing Milosevic
Gregory L. Schulte
a fter a decade of war in afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration has adopted a new defense strategy that recognizes the need to limit our strategic ends in an era of increasing limits on our military means.1 the strategy calls for armed forces capable of conducting a broad range of missions, in a full range of contingencies, and in a global context that is increasingly complex. It calls for doing so with a smaller defense budget. Opportunities for savings come from reducing the ability to fight two regional conflicts simultaneously and from not sizing the force to conduct prolonged, large-scale stability operations. Seemingly missing from the new defense strategy are the types of wars we fought in afghanistan and Iraq. Both started with forcible changes in regime – the armed ouster of the taliban and Saddam Hussein from their positions of power. In each case, the rapid removal of leadership was followed by lengthy counterinsurgency operations to bring security to the population and build up a new government. the duration and difficulty of these operations and their cost in deaths, destruction, and debt were not understood at their outset.
Changing of the Guard: Civilian Protection for an Evolving Military
Larry Lewis, Sarah Holewinski
Civilian casualties can risk the success of a combat mission. While not new, this is a lesson uS defense forces have had to repeatedly relearn. Historically, civilian protection and efforts to address harm became priorities only when external pressures demanded attention. as the Pentagon reshapes its defenses and fighting force for the next decade, continuing this ad hoc pattern in the future is neither strategically smart nor ethically acceptable. the budget submitted this year to Congress by Secretary of Defense Panetta charts a strategic shift toward smaller and more clandestine operations. Our forces will need to become leaner and more agile, able to take decisive action without the heavy footprint of recent wars. there are good political and economic reasons for this; certainly, maintaining a large military presence around the world is no longer feasible.
Building the Capabilities and Capacity of Partners: Is this Defense Business?
James Q. Roberts
t he new defense strategy, “Sustaining u.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” released in January of this 2012, makes clear the mandate for the Department of Defense to continue, in fact to increase significantly, its abilities to improve the capabilities of partners around the globe. In his cover letter to the guidance, President Barack Obama directs us to “join with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity.” Likewise, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in his preface, stresses that the department will focus on “strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions.” this is not traditional guidance for the Department of Defense. Such guidance usually focuses on how to fight and win the nation’s wars. But after more than ten years of combat operations in afghanistan and Iraq, and in these times of impending steep fiscal reductions the utility of partners who can share the burden of defending their countries individually, and their regions collectively, has come to the fore. this guidance displays the degree to which the department in general, and the Geographic Combatant Commanders in particular, have come to recognize the value in helping partners improve their capability to govern their own territories.
The Uneasy Relationship Between Economics and Security
Alexander Ferguson
The most publicly discussed link between economics and security is the relationship between economic performance and power. the underpinnings for this relationship come from the philosophical approach that sees political power stemming from economic power. espoused at least since the 17th century by english Civil War philosopher James Harrington,1 these ideas saw their most well known expression in the philosophy of Karl Marx, who saw economic change driving political change. If economic structures determined politics then the link with security is clear. Carl von Clausewitz’s likened war to other areas of conflict within developed societies, such as commerce and politics: “It is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that is it different from others.”2
Three Design Concepts Introduced for Strategic and Operational Applications
Ben Zweibelson
Many discussions on design theory applications within military contexts often revolve around a small population of design practitioners using complex terms and exclusive language, contrasted by a larger population of design skeptics that routinely demand a universal, scripted, and complete examples for “doing design right.”1 Design, a form of conceptual planning and sense making, continues to gain traction in strategic political and military institutions, yet faces misunderstanding, disinterest, and outright rejection from military strategists and operational planners for a variety of reasons. this article aims at moving this discourse toward how several design theory concepts are valuable for strategists and decision makers, and how select design concepts might be introduced and applied in a simple language where military practitioners can traverse from strategic intent into operational applications with tangible results. as a lead planner for the afghan Security Force reduction concept and the 2014 (NtM-a) transition Plan, I applied design to strategic and operational level planning using these design concepts as well as others.2
Sri Lanka's Rehabilitation Program: A New Frontier in Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency
Malkanthi Hettiarachchi
The liberation tigers of tamil ealam (ltte), sometimes referred to as the tamil tigers, or simply the tigers, was a separatist militant organization based in northern Sri lanka. It was founded in May 1976 by Prabhakaran and waged a violent secessionist and nationalist campaign to create an independent state in the north and east of Sri lanka for the tamil people. this campaign evolved into the Sri lankan Civil War.1 the tigers were considered one of the most ruthless insurgent and terrorist organisations in the world.2 they were vanquished by the Sri lankan armed forces in May 2009. 3 In order to rehabilitate the 11,6644 tigers who had surrendered or been taken captive, Sri lanka developed a multifaceted program to engage and transform the violent attitudes and behaviours of the tiger leaders, members and collaborators. 5 Since the end of the ltte’s three-decade campaign of insurgency and terrorism, there has not been a single act of terrorism in the country. Many attribute Sri lanka’s post-conflict stability to the success of the insurgent and terrorist rehabilitation program.
Decade of War: Enduring Lessons from a Decade of Operations
Elizabeth Young
The year 2001 began with the inauguration of a U.S. President deliberately aiming to shift the use of the military away from the numerous humanitarian and peacekeeping interventions of the 1990s toward responding to and defeating conventional threats from nation-states. The mood was optimistic, with the new U.S. national Security Strategy, recently put in place by the departing Clinton administration, citing widespread financial prosperity and conveying no sense of an imminent threat to the homeland.2 But this situation proved fragile: the events of a single day, September 11, 2001, altered the trajectory of the United States and the way it used its military over the next decade. a nation focused on countering conventional threats was now confronted by an enemy that attacked the homeland with low-tech means in asymmetric and unexpected ways—individuals armed with box-cutters using hijacked civilian aircraft.
Interagency Rebuilding Efforts in Iraq: a Case Study of the Rusafa Political District
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Craig Collier
From 2004-2012, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducted 387 inspections and audits of U.S.-funded projects and programs that supported stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq. Most of SIGIR’s reviews focused on large-scale projects or programs. In a recent special report, SIGIR accomplished a novel study examining a particular part of the rebuilding effort. That report reviewed the remarkably diverse spectrum of programs and projects executed in a crucial geographic area in Iraq, the Rusafa Political district, delving into who built what and at what cost. The nature of this new report opens the door to deeper perspectives on what was actually achieved – and how it was achieved–by various U.S. government agencies operating during operation Iraqi Freedom (oIF). SIGIR elicited seven lessons-learned from the study, which conclude this article.1
As the senior State Department executive responsible for civilian security and human rights, what are the biggest challenges you face? Otero:we face a variety of challenges. Some are external to the State Department, while some are internal. Before I describe some of these, though, let me put them in context. essentially, part of Secretary Clinton’s vision for 21st century statecraft consists of bringing together all of the bureaus in the State Department that in one way or another address the question of civilian security, or how we help governments and other elements of a democratic society strengthen institutions and legal frameworks that ultimately protect citizens from a range of modern threats. this includes bureaus that address the hard security issues of counterterrorism and war crimes, to those that handle what are considered soft security issues: human rights, democracy, rule of law, and humanitarian assistance. If we look at the Department as a whole, there are five bureaus and three offices that in some way respond to civilian security. these eight bureaus and offices handle a total of about 4.5 billion dollars in resources, and manage hundreds of employees around the world.
In the Whirlwind of Jihad By Martha Brill Olcott
John Herbst
Understanding the underlying dynamics of political and social life is not easy in any society and particularly in authoritarian ones. The challenge is even greater when the society in question is remote and has been isolated for decades as Central Asia was under Soviet rule. kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan emerged as reluctant independent states in 1991 when the Soviet Union dissolved.
Great Game, Local Rules and the New Great Power Context in Central Asia By Alexander Cooley
John Herbst
I n Great Game, Local Rules the New Great Power Contest in Central Asia, Alexander Cooley develops an excellent analytical framework for looking at the activities of China, Russia and the United States in Central Asia. Cooley offers three broad arguments. First, he observes that the three big powers have pursued different goals in Central Asia, which has meant that their interests do not necessarily conflict. China’s main objective has been to stabilize Xinjiang by ensuring cooperative relationships on Xinjiang’s border. This prompted beijing to resolve border disputes with kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and kazakhstan on favorable terms for its Central Asian neighbors. The U.S. has sought to stabilize Afghanistan by establishing supply and base arrangements in Central Asia. Despite the ups and downs with Tashkent which led to the closing of the U.S. base at karshi khanabad in 2005, washington has largely achieved its objectives in the region. Russia has sought to remain the major power or hegemon in the region. Despite this ambitious goal, Moscow has been willing to accept efforts by the U.S. to establish bases in Central Asia because it also is interested in containing, if not defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan.